Debunking the Burning Ships: Examining a Popular Narrative of the Conquest of Al-Andalus

One of the most enduring and dramatic stories associated with the early Muslim conquest of Al-Andalus (modern-day Spain and Portugal) is the tale of Tariq ibn Ziyad burning his ships upon landing. The narrative often portrays Tariq telling his troops that they have no means of escape – the sea is behind them, and the enemy is in front – leaving them with no option but to fight for victory or perish. This story is frequently cited as a key moment that galvanized the small Muslim force against the much larger Gothic army.

However, a close examination of historical sources, particularly trusted Muslim accounts, reveals a strong argument against the veracity of this popular narrative. The author of the Al-Andalus from Conquest to Fall (Volume 2) - Ragheb El-Sergany explicitly challenges this story, presenting several detailed points to debunk it.

The Problem of the Chain of Transmission (Sanad)

A fundamental argument against the burning ships story lies in its absence from reliable Muslim historical texts. In Islamic scholarship, the chain of transmission (sanad) is crucial for authenticating historical accounts and sayings. The author emphasizes the importance of this process, mentioning the sciences of Ilm al-Rijal (knowledge of men) and Ilm al-Jarh wa al-Ta'dil (science of disparagement and authentication), which are used to assess the trustworthiness of narrators1.

According to the author, the burning ships narrative simply does not appear in the writings of trusted Muslim historians1. Instead, its presence is noted specifically in European accounts of the Battle of Wadi Barbate1. This significant lack of corroboration in the primary sources from the Muslim side, who were the protagonists of the event, casts serious doubt on the story's historical basis.

Absence of Reaction from Contemporary Muslim Leadership

If Tariq ibn Ziyad had indeed undertaken such a drastic and unconventional action as burning his entire fleet, it is highly probable that it would have elicited a significant reaction from his superiors. The author points out that Musa ibn Nusayr, Tariq's immediate commander and the governor of North Africa2..., or even the Caliph Al-Walid ibn Abd al-Malik in Damascus, would likely have commented on, questioned, or discussed this extraordinary decision7.

Furthermore, such an act might also have prompted discussion among Muslim scholars regarding its permissibility or strategic wisdom7. The fact that there is a striking absence of any recorded reactions, inquiries, or scholarly commentary on the burning of the ships in Muslim historical texts provides strong evidence suggesting the event did not occur7.

European Motivation for Spreading the Narrative

The author proposes a compelling reason why the burning ships story might have originated and been propagated in European sources. The historical reality of the Battle of Wadi Barbate was that a relatively small Muslim army, numbering around 12,000 men (mostly infantry with limited cavalry), faced a vastly superior Gothic Christian force, estimated at 100,000 men89. This significant disparity in numbers, coupled with the Muslims fighting in unfamiliar territory, presented a considerable military challenge10.

According to the author, European analysts found it difficult to explain how such a small force could achieve a decisive victory against overwhelming odds on the enemy's home ground7. Unable to attribute the success solely to military strategy or the faith and fighting spirit of the Muslim soldiers, they may have sought another explanation7. The burning ships narrative provided a convenient answer: the Muslims fought with unmatched ferocity not out of religious zeal, but out of sheer desperation, knowing they had no retreat7. They were forced to fight to the death to survive7.

The author contrasts this perspective with a fundamental principle in Islam, highlighted in the Quran (2:249), which states that "how many a small company has overcome a large company by permission of Allah"11. Muslim history is filled with examples where smaller Muslim armies achieved victory against larger foes, considering this the norm rather than an exception11. The source even references the Battle of Hunayn, where an initial feeling of confidence due to large numbers nearly led to defeat before divine assistance granted victory (Quran 9:25)1112. This suggests that the European narrative, by focusing on the alleged forced desperation, attempts to offer a worldly explanation for a victory that, from an Islamic perspective, could be seen as divinely aided or a testament to the spiritual strength and motivation of the fighters7....

The Innate Motivation of the Muslim Soldiers

Another crucial point raised against the burning ships story is the inherent motivation of the Muslim soldiers who participated in the conquest of Al-Andalus. These were not unwilling conscripts forced into battle. The author argues that they came to Al-Andalus willingly, driven by a desire for Jihad for the sake of God and actively seeking martyrdom12.

Given this existing high level of spiritual and religious motivation, the author contends that a commander like Tariq ibn Ziyad would not have needed to resort to an extreme measure like destroying their only means of retreat to "hype them up" for battle12. This kind of forced motivation, the author suggests, might be characteristic of armies fighting for worldly gain ("أهل الدنيا")13. The source contrasts this with the Persian army at the Battle of Dhat al-Salasil, who were reportedly chained together to prevent retreat – a tactic of forceful control rather than spiritual motivation1213. A Muslim army, motivated by faith and the hope of paradise or martyrdom, was inherently driven to fight1213.

Strategic Illogic for a Seasoned Commander

Finally, the author argues that burning the ships would have been strategically illogical for a competent and experienced commander such as Tariq ibn Ziyad6.... Tariq was known for his skill614. A key aspect of military strategy is maintaining a line of retreat. While fighting bravely is paramount in Islam, tactical withdrawal is permissible under certain circumstances, such as maneuvering to a better position or retreating to join a larger friendly force1315. The Quran itself provides exceptions for turning one's back in battle (Quran 8:15-16)1315.

Deliberately eliminating the possibility of retreat by burning the ships would leave the army vulnerable in case of unforeseen circumstances or a tactical need to fall back13. The author notes that "days are changeable" (الأيام دول)13, meaning that victory is not always guaranteed, and a commander must account for the possibility of needing to withdraw. A seasoned military leader like Tariq ibn Ziyad would understand this and would not intentionally place his army in such a precarious position with no fallback option13.

Conclusion

Based on the arguments presented in the source, the popular story of Tariq ibn Ziyad burning his ships appears to be a later addition to the historical narrative, lacking support in trusted Muslim accounts. The author effectively challenges the story by highlighting the absence of a reliable chain of transmission, the lack of reactions from contemporary Muslim figures, and the strategic illogic of such an act for a capable commander. Furthermore, the source suggests that the narrative may have been promoted in European accounts to explain the seemingly improbable victory of a small Muslim force against a much larger Christian army, attributing it to forced desperation rather than the genuine faith and motivation of the Muslim fighters.

The historical evidence, according to this source, suggests that the Muslim conquest of Al-Andalus was driven by faith, strategic planning (like securing supply lines and understanding the terrain, as Musa ibn Nusayr and Tariq did1617), and the willingness of the soldiers to face the enemy for their beliefs, not by an act of desperate, forced bravery born from the destruction of their retreat.